Abstract. Consider an electronic election scheme implemented using a mix-net; a large number of voters submit their votes and then a smaller number of servers compute the result. The mix-net accepts an encrypted vote from each voter and outputs the set of votes in sorted order without revealing the permutation used. To ensure a fair election, the votes of corrupt voters should be independent of the votes of honest voters, i.e., some type of non-malleability or plaintext awareness is needed. However, for efficiency reasons the servers typically expect inputs from some homomorphic cryptosystem, which is inherently malleable. In this paper we consider the problem of how non-malleability can be guaranteed in the submission phase and still allow the servers to start their computation with ciphertexts of the appropriate homomorphic cryptosystem. This can clearly be achieved using general techniques, but we would like a solution which is: (1) provably secure under standard assumptions, (2) non-interactive for the submitting parties, (3) very efficient for all parties in terms of computation and communication.
Introduction
Mix-Nets. A mix-net is a cryptographic protocol executed by N senders and k mixservers, where typically N is quite large and k is fairly small, e.g., N = 10 4 and k = 10. The functionality implemented by a mix-net corresponds to a trusted party that collects inputs from the senders and then outputs the inputs in sorted order. The main application of mix-nets is for electronic elections. All known efficient robust mix-nets exploit the homomorphic properties of cryptosystems such as the El Gamal cryptosystem [13] in an essential way. A problem with using a homomorphic cryptosystem in the submission phase is that corrupted senders can submit inputs that are related to those of honest senders.
Formally, the proof of security fails. When using the simulation paradigm, e.g., universally composable security [4] , a mix-net is said to be secure if for every adversary attacking the mix-net there is an ideal adversary (simulator), typically running the adversary as a black-box, attacking the ideal mix-net (the trusted party mentioned above) such that no environment can tell the two models apart. The simulator does not know the inputs of the honest parties and replaces them in its simulation, e.g., by zero messages. It must also extract the inputs of corrupted parties in its simulation and hand them to the ideal mix-net, since otherwise these inputs would be missing in the output from the ideal mix-net and the environment could trivially distinguish the two models. Any successful adversary must result in a successful attack against the underlying cryptosystem, which means that the simulator can not use the secret key of the cryptosystem to extract the inputs of corrupt senders.
General Case. More generally, consider a cryptographic protocol that starts with a submission phase where many parties submit ciphertexts formed with a public key pk , and a smaller group of servers hold shares of the secret key sk corresponding to pk . The servers then compute and publish some function of the input plaintexts. Typically, efficient protocols exploit the algebraic structure of the cryptosystem, e.g., homomorphic properties. The problem with using a polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem directly in such protocols is that it does not guarantee that the plaintexts submitted by corrupt parties are unrelated to those submitted by honest users.
Formally, the problem surfaces when the cryptographer constructing the protocol tries to reduce the security of his/her scheme to the security of the cryptosystem. If the simulation paradigm is used, some kind of simulator must be constructed and the simulator must extract the values of the corrupt parties to be able to hand these to an ideal version of the protocol. The existence of a successful adversary must contradict the security of the cryptosystem, i.e., extraction must be done without using the secret key of the cryptosystem. This is not possible using only a polynomially indistinguishable [14] cryptosystem.
The Submission Problem. The submission problem is how to find a submission scheme such that: (a) the inputs of corrupted parties can be extracted by the simulator without using the secret key, and (b) its output is a list of ciphertexts of the form expected by the servers computing the result. These requirements are essential to allow use of the submission scheme as a prefix to the main protocol, but there are also several natural additional properties that we can look for, or even require, in the submission phase.
1. The solution should be provably secure under standard assumptions in the plain model, i.e., without any random oracles or generic groups. 2. The submission of an input should be non-interactive for a submitting party and interaction between the servers should be limited, e.g., independent of the number of senders. 3. The communication and computational complexity of the submittors should not depend on the number of servers.
Previous Work
Informally, we may view any solution to the problem as a form of proof of knowledge of the encrypted plaintext, since any solution must allow the simulator to extract the submitted plaintext without knowledge of the secret key of the polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem. We classify the solutions in the literature and some minor extensions as follows:
1. An interactive proof of knowledge [15] is used, either with a straight-line extractor in the public key setting using the Naor and Yung [18] double-ciphertext trick, or with a rewinding extractor.
2.
A non-interactive proof of knowledge using general techniques [2] is used. This is not efficient for either the submittor or the servers, even using the recent techniques of Groth et al. [16] . Note that this is essentially the construction of a CCA2-secure cryptosystems under general assumptions given by Sahai [23] based on the Naor-Yung double-ciphertext trick, but starting from a concrete polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem with useful structure. 3. A non-interactive (for the submitter) proof of knowledge based on verifiable secret sharing is used, for example using techniques from Abe, Cramer, and Fehr [1] . Then the computational and communication complexity of the submitting party grows linearly with the number of servers, since each server must receive an encrypted secret share, and the servers must communicate for each submitted ciphertext to verify its proof. 4. A non-interactive proof of knowledge in the random oracle model is used, either using the Naor and Yung double ciphertext trick, or with rewinding. Such solutions are typically efficient, but unfortunately only heuristically secure [5] . Note that the CCA2-secure cryptosystems in the random oracle model given by Shoup and Gennaro [25] may be viewed as instantiations of this solution. 5. An arbitrary CCA2-secure cryptosystem is used and ciphertexts are translated into suitable polynomially indistinguishable ciphertexts using general multiparty computation techniques. This is inefficient both in terms of computation and communication. 6. A special CCA2-secure cryptosystem such that a ciphertext can be transformed more easily into a new ciphertext for the basic polynomially indistinguishable scheme needed by the servers is used. We list the solutions of this type we are aware of below.
(a) Canetti and Goldwasser [6] and Lysyanskaya and Peikert [17] have given CCA2-secure cryptosystems with distributed decryption which allows transforming ciphertexts into ciphertexts for polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystems. These either involve interaction, expensive setup assumptions, or only work for a small number of servers. (b) Boneh, Boyen, and Halevi [3] give a CCA2-secure cryptosystem with distributed decryption that may be viewed as containing a polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem, but its security is based on a non-standard complexity assumption based on pairings. (c) Cramer, Damgård, and Ishai [7] present a solution based on distributed pseudo random functions and share conversion that is reasonably efficient for a small number of servers.
To summarize, there are numerous solutions to the submission problem which satisfies properties (a) and (b), but no such solution has the properties (1)-(3) listed above.
Our Contribution
We give a simple solution to the submission problem that is efficient both in terms of computation and communication.
The Idea. Recall the original construction of Cramer and Shoup [9] . The cryptosystem is deployed in a group G q of prime order in which the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption is assumed to be hard. The key generator first chooses two random generators g 0 , g 1 ∈ G q . Then it chooses random exponents x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 , z ∈ Z q and defines c = g
, and h = g z 0 . It also generates a collision-free hash function H. Finally, it outputs (pk , sk ) = ((H, g 0 , g 1 , c, d, h), (x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 , z)). To encrypt a message m ∈ G q using the public key pk the encryption algorithm chooses r ∈ Z q randomly and outputs the tuple (u 0 , u 1 , e, v) = (g r 0 , g r 1 , h r m, c r d rH(u 0 ,u 1 ,e) ). To decrypt a tuple (u 0 , u 1 , e, v) ∈ G 4 q using the secret key sk the decryption algorithm first checks the validity of the ciphertext by testing if u
If so it outputs e/u z 0 , and otherwise the unit element, i.e., 1, of the group. 1 Note that h = g z and z have the form of an El Gamal [13] public and secret key respectively and that (u 0 , e) is nothing more than an El Gamal ciphertext. This is of course not a new observation. What seems to be a new observation is the fact that the holder of the secret key may reveal (x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) without any loss in security as long as it never decrypts any ciphertext constructed after this point, and that this solves the submission problem.
Generalizing and Applying the Idea. To allow us to generalize the observation about the original Cramer-Shoup scheme and identify a class of cryptosystems for which it applies, we introduce the notion of an augmented cryptosystem which contains another cryptosystem as a component. In applications the latter cryptosystem will have some useful structure, e.g., be homomorphic, that allows more efficient and simpler protocols. We also introduce a strengthened variation of CCA2-security called submission security and observe that the generic scheme of Cramer and Shoup [10] already satisfies this stronger definition. Finally, we illustrate the use of the new notion by applying it to general secure function evaluation, which strictly generalizes the notion of a mix-net.
Limitations of Our Approach. When using our solution, no new inputs can be accepted after part of the secret key is revealed. This is a minor drawback in the targeted applications, since we have a large number of submitting parties and executions of the underlying protocol are infrequent. When a new session is executed the servers simply generate a new key. However, it may be useful to re-use the public key of the basic cryptosystem in the underlying protocol. Thus, our definitions require that the augmentation can be replaced by a freshly generated augmentation without any loss in security. This allows using several independent augmentations that may be revealed sequentially, i.e., inputs can be processed in batches and then input to the same underlying protocol. We remark that for general threshold decryption, e.g. [6] , our approach is not reasonable, since users requesting a decryption expect the result immediately.
Notation
We denote by PT and PPT the sets of deterministic and probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines respectively, and write PT * for the set of non-uniform polynomial time Turing machines. We use n to denote the security parameter, and say that a function ǫ(n) is negligible if for every constant c there exists a constant n 0 such that ǫ(n) < n −c for n > n 0 . If pk is the public key of a cryptosystem, we denote by M pk , C pk , and R pk the plaintext space, the ciphertext space, and the randomness space respectively.
Augmented Cryptosystems
Keeping our observation about the original Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in mind, we formalize a general class of augmented cryptosystems that given part of the secret key allow conversion of a ciphertext into a ciphertext of another basic cryptosystem. In applications, the basic cryptosystem typically has special properties, e.g., it is homomorphic, that are exploited by the cryptographic protocol. We introduce the following definition.
if there exists an augmentation algorithm Aug ∈ PPT and a stripping algorithm Strip ∈ PT such that:
, and outputs (pk , sk ) = ((pk A : pk B ), (sk A : sk B )).
On input ((sk
Clearly, any cryptosystem can be viewed as a trivial augmentation of itself, and if it is CCA2-secure then the trivial augmentation is also submission secure as defined below. We are interested in non-trivial augmentations where CS B has structural properties useful in the construction of protocols.
Some readers may find it tempting to use a definition that mirrors the CramerShoup cryptosystem more closely to avoid the existence of trivial augmentations, i.e., one could explicitly require that it is possible to check the "validity" of a ciphertext using sk A . We remind those readers that for most cryptographic notions there are trivial instances, e.g., the identity map is a cryptosystem, and we see no reason to impose unnecessary conditions on which particular properties of the basic cryptosystem that should be considered useful.
Submission Security of Augmented Cryptosystems
Recall the game considered in the definition of CCA2-security [18, 11, 22] . The adversary is given a public key pk . Then it may ask any number of decryption queries to a decryption oracle Dec sk (·) holding the secret key sk corresponding to pk . The adversary must then choose two challenge messages m 0 and m 1 . The game is parameterized by a bit b and returns a challenge ciphertext of the form c = Enc pk (m b ). Then the adversary is again allowed to ask arbitrary decryption queries to Dec sk (·) with the exception of c, and must finally output a guess b ′ of the bit b. If the cryptosystem is CCA2-secure, then the difference in distribution of b ′ when b = 0 or b = 1 respectively, should be negligible.
In the game we consider, the adversary is given a public key pk B of the basic cryptosystem. It can request that the experiment generates a fresh augmentation (pk
, and returns pk j = (pk A j : pk B ) to the adversary. This is done by submitting the integer j to its pk A (·) -oracle. Any subsequent identical queries j give the same pk j . It can ask decryption queries. This is done by submitting an index and ciphertext pair (j, c ′ ) to its Dec sk (·) (·)-oracle. It can request that the experiment reveals an augmentation sk 
Experiment 1 (Submission Security, Exp
The experiment returns 0 if Dec sk (·) (·) was queried on (i, c) or if it was queried on (j, c ′ ) for some c ′ after sk A (·) was queried on j. Otherwise the experiment returns d.
We could equivalently have defined a game where the game only generates an augmentation if requested to do so by the adversary, but the above is conceptually simpler.
Definition 2 (Submission Security
). An augmentation CS of CS B is said to be submission secure if ∀A ∈ PT * : | Pr[Exp
Example 1. A simple example of a submission secure cryptosystem can be derived from the scheme of Sahai [23] based on the Naor and Yung double ciphertext trick [18] . A polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem CS B is given and a CCA2-secure cryptosystem CS = (Kg, Enc, Dec) is constructed as follows. To generate a public key, compute (pk
, and generate a common reference string CRS. Then output (pk , sk ) = ((pk
, where π is a simulation sound non-interactive adaptively zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) that the same message is encrypted in c 0 and c 1 . To decrypt, verify the NIZKP and output Dec B sk 0 (c 0 ) or 0 depending on if the NIZKP was accepted or not. We could define a cryptosystem CS ′ = (Kg, Enc B , Dec B ) where the latter two algorithms are executed on pk If we view CS as an augmentation of CS ′ it is submission secure. Although this example does not satisfy our additional requirements of a solution to the submission problem (it is very inefficient) it does simplify the analysis of the submission phase of a theoretical construction based on such a cryptosystem.
Generic Cramer-Shoup Is Submission Secure
The fact that the generic CCA2-secure cryptosystem of Cramer and Shoup is submission secure if we view it as an augmentation of a basic polynomially indistinguishable cryptosystem is quite easy to see from their security proof. On the other hand we need to show that this is indeed the case. Thus, we recall their scheme and prove this fact in the appendix, but we use coarse-grained and streamlined definitions. We also take the liberty of ignoring the technical problem of constructing efficiently computable hash families, since this complicates the definitions and does not add anything to our exposition (see [10] for details).
Preliminaries
Subset Membership Problems. A subset membership problem consists of three sets X, L X, and W , and a relation R ⊂ X × W . The idea is that it should be hard to decide if an element is sampled from L or from X \ L. To be useful in cryptography we also need some algorithms that allow us to sample instances and elements, and check for membership in X. Definition 3. A subset membership problem M consists of a collection of distributions (I n ) n∈N , an instance generator Ins ∈ PPT, a sampling algorithm Sam ∈ PPT, and a membership checking algorithm Mem ∈ PT such that:
1. I n is a distribution on instance descriptions Λ[X, L, W, R] specifying finite nonempty sets X, L X, and W , and a binary relation R ⊂ X × W . 2. On input 1 n , Ins outputs an instance Λ with distribution statistically close to I n . 3. On input 1 n and Λ[X, L, W, R] ∈ [I n ], Sam outputs (x, w) ∈ R, where the distribution of x is statistically close to uniform over L.
, and ζ ∈ {0, 1} * , Mem outputs 1 or 0 depending on if ζ ∈ X or not.
Definition 4. Let M be a subset membership problem. Sample Λ from I n and let x and x ′ be randomly distributed over L and X \ L respectively. We say that M is hard if for all A ∈ PT
Hash Families. Hash families are well known in the cryptographic literature and there are many variations. We assume that all families are indexed by a security parameter n.
Definition 5. A projective hash family H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) consists of finite non-empty sets K, X, L X, Π, and S, a function α : K → S, and a collection of hash functions
Definition 6. Let H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) be a projective hash family, and let k ∈ K be random. Then H is universal 2 if for all s ∈ S, x, x ′ ∈ X with x ∈ L ∪ {x ′ }, and
The following definition and lemma are stated informally in [10] .
Experiment 2 (Computationally Universal
H,A (n)). Let τ k be the predicate defined by τ k ((x, π x ), π) ⇐⇒ H k (x, π x ) = π, and consider the following experiment.
Denote by ((x i , π x,i ), π i ) the ith query to τ k , and let i l be the index of the last query before the first output. If A asks a query (( H,A (n) = 1] is negligible. Lemma 1. If a projective hash family H is universal 2 , then it is computationally universal 2 . Definition 8. Let H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α) be a projective hash family, and let k ∈ K, x ∈ X \ L, and π ∈ X be random. Then H is smooth if for every π x ∈ Π the distributions of (x, π x , α(k), H k (x, π x )) and (x, π x , α(k), π) are statistically close.
Universal Hash Proof Systems. Informally, a hash proof system may be viewed as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system where only the holder of a secret key corresponding to the public common random string can verify a proof. Strictly speaking, the definition below corresponds, in the unconditional case, to a special case of what Cramer and Shoup [10] call "extended strongly (smooth, universal 2 )" hash proof system. Definition 9. A (smooth, (computational) universal 2 ) hash proof system P for a subset membership problem M associates with each instance Λ[X, L, W, R] a (smooth, (computationally) universal 2 ) projective hash family H = (H, K, X, L, Π, S, α), and the following algorithms 1. A key generation algorithm Gen ∈ PPT that on input 1 n and Λ ∈ [I n ] outputs (s, k), where k is randomly distributed in K and s = α(k). 2. A private evaluation algorithm PEval ∈ PT that on input 1 n , Λ ∈ [I n ], k ∈ K, and (x, π x ) ∈ X × Π outputs H k (x, π x ). 3. A public evaluation algorithm Eval ∈ PT that on input 1 n , Λ ∈ [I n ], α(k) with k ∈ K, (x, π x ) and w, with (x, w) ∈ R and π x ∈ Π, outputs H k (x, π x ). 4. A membership checking algorithm Mem ∈ PT that on input 1 n , Λ ∈ [I n ], and ζ ∈ {0, 1} * outputs 1 or 0 depending on if ζ ∈ Π or not.
Generic Scheme of Cramer and Shoup
Given the definitions above it is not hard to describe the generic cryptosystem of Cramer and Shoup [10] . Let M be a hard subset membership problem, such that Π can be fitted with a group operation for any Λ, let P 0 = (Gen 0 , PEval 0 , Eval 0 , Mem 0 ) be a smooth hash proof system for M, and let P 1 = (Gen 1 , PEval 1 , Eval 1 , Mem 1 ) be a computationally universal 2 hash proof system for M.
, and output the key pair (pk , sk ) = (( s : Λ, s), ( k : k)). Encryption of a message m ∈ Π. Compute (x, w) = Sam(Λ), π = Eval 0 (Λ, s, x, w) = H k (x), e = m + π, and π = Eval 1 (Λ, s, x, w, e) = H b k (x, e), and output (x, e, π). Decryption of a ciphertext (x, e, π). Output m = e−PEval 0 (Λ, k, x) = e−H k (x), only if PEval 1 (Λ, k, x, e) = H b k (x, e) = π and otherwise output 0.
We have not modified the cryptosystem, except that we have introduced a comma in the notation to distinguish the two parts of the public and secret keys as needed in the definition of submission security, and we have replaced the special symbol ⊥ by the zero plaintext. Write CS = (Kg, Enc, Dec) for the cryptosystem, and let CS B = (Kg B , Enc B , Dec B ) be the underlying basic cryptosystem defined as follows. It has public key (Λ, s) and secret key k. A message m ∈ Π is encrypted as (x, e), where e = Eval 0 (Λ, s, x, w) + m, and a ciphertext (x, e) is decrypted by computing e − PEval 0 (Λ, k, x). It is clear that CS is an augmentation of CS B , since we can define Aug(Λ, s) = Gen 1 (1 n , Λ) and define Strip pk , b k (x, e, π) to output (x, e) if PEval 1 (Λ, k, x, e) = π and otherwise Enc pk B (0, 0). Cramer and Shoup prove (see Theorem 1 in [10] ) that CS is CCA2-secure under the assumption that M is hard. We show a stronger result. Proposition 1. If M is a hard subset membership problem, then CS is a submission secure augmentation of CS B .
For a proof of the proposition we refer the reader to the appendix. The key observations needed to extend Cramer's and Shoup's proof of CCA2-security are:
1. The projective property of hash proofs implies that proofs computed using a witness and hash proofs computed using the private key k are identical (indeed this is how a hash proof is verified). This means that the holder of k can "perfectly simulate" proofs without the witness, i.e., even if k is made public the "simulated proof" looks exactly like a proof computed using a witness. 2. The soundness of proofs computed by an adversary before k is made public, is not decreased by the publishing of k.
The generic Cramer-Shoup scheme generalizes several concrete schemes described in [10] , such as the El Gamal based scheme in the introduction, but also schemes based on the Paillier cryposystem [19] . Both schemes are common in efficient protocols.
Applications of Submission Security
The original motivation for this paper was to come up with a practical non-interactive submission phase in El Gamal based mix-nets. For readers that are not familiar with mix-nets we give an informal description of a construction that goes back to Sako and Kilian [24] .
Then we illustrate how the notion of submission secure augmented cryptosystems can be used to construct and analyze the submission phase of a protocol in a modularized way for general secure function evaluation, and explain how this generalizes the mix-net setting in the informal description.
Informal Description of Application to a Mix-Net
There are many senders S 1 , . . . , S N and a small number of mix-servers M 1 , . . . , M k , e.g., N = 10 4 and k = 10. In a joint key generation phase the mix-servers generate a joint public key (g, h) such that each mix-server holds a verifiable secret share s j of the joint secret key z such that h = g z . To submit a message m i ∈ G q a sender S i computes an El Gamal ciphertext (u 0,i , e 0,i ) = (g r i , h r i m i ), where r i ∈ Z q is randomly chosen. Then the mix-servers take turns at re-encrypting, using the homomorphic property of El Gamal, and permuting the list of ciphertexts. In other words, for j = 1, . . . , k, M j computes and publishes {(u j,i , e j,i )} = {(u j−1,π j (i) g t j,i , e j−1,π j (i) h t j,i )}, where t j,i ∈ Z q and π j are random. Finally, the mix-servers jointly and verifiably decrypt the list {(u k,i , e k,i )} output by the last mix-server M k using their shares s j , sort the result, and output it.
The idea is that due to the transformations computed by the mix-servers the correspondence between the output plaintexts and the input ciphertexts should be hidden. To ensure robustness, each mix-server also prove correctness of the transformation it computes on the list of ciphertexts (in fact it must prove knowledge of a witness of the transformation as pointed out in [27] ).
Unfortunately, the construction is completely insecure [21] , since a malicious sender S l may compute its ciphertext as (u 0,l , e 0,l ) = (u a 0,i , e a 0,i ) for some random exponent a and then identify a matching pair (m, m a ) in the final output. This reveals the message sent by the honest sender S i . Intuitively, what is needed is a non-malleable cryptosystem, but on the other hand the cryptosystem must be homomorphic for reencryption to be possible. Formally, what is needed in the overall proof of security of the mix-net (see [26, 27, 29] ) is a way to extract the messages submitted by corrupted players without using the secret key of the cryptosystem, as explained in the introduction. In previous work this is either solved heuristically, or as in the cited works a proof of knowledge is used explicitly.
We augment the above to make the cryptosystem used for submission identical to the Cramer-Shoup scheme. We set g 0 = g and let the mix-servers generate g 1 ∈ G q , x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ∈ Z q , c = g 
Application to a General Functionality
In this section we give a proof of concept for augmented cryptosystem and submission security. We do this by showing how the submission phase can be factored out in the construction and analysis of a multiparty protocol using a submission secure augmented cryptosystem. To keep the exposition clear and ignore irrelevant problems, we show this in the UC-framework [4] and assume the existence of ideal functionalities for the building blocks of the protocol we realize. For simplicity we assume that the adversary can not influence if or when messages are delivered.
Ideal Secure Function Evaluation. Below we formalize secure function evaluation as an ideal functionality. We focus on situations where a large group of submittors give inputs and a smaller group of servers compute the result. , f (x1, . . . , xN ) ) to S and all Mj .
The functionality simply accepts inputs from the submittor (at most one input for each submittor), waits until a majority of the servers request the result, and computes and outputs the result. Recall that the ideal mix-net functionality [26] accepts inputs from senders until a majority of the mix-servers request the sorted list of inputs from senders. Thus, this is an instance of this functionality.
Ideal Secure Function Evaluation On Encrypted Inputs. Consider now the functionality below, which is parameterized by a function f and a cryptosystem CS. for a function f with cryptosystem CS, running with parties M1, . . . , M k , and ideal adversary S proceeds as follows.
1. Generate a key pair (pk , sk ) = Kg(1 n ), and hand (PublicKey, pk ) to S and all Mj. 2. Initialize D = ∅ and DM = ∅, and repeatedly wait for inputs:
-On input (Input, Cj ) from Mj such that j ∈ DM , set D ← D ∪ {(j, Cj)} and DM ← DM ∪ {j}, and hand (Input, Cj) to S. If |{(j, Cj ) : Cj = C}| ≥ (k + 1)/2 for some C, then go to Step 3. 3. Interpret C as a list (c1, . . . , c l ) of ciphertexts, compute x = (Dec sk (c1) , . . . , Dec sk (c l )) and y = f (x), and hand (Output, y) to S and all Mj.
The functionality generates and outputs a public key pk of the cryptosystem. Then it waits for inputs, i.e., lists of ciphertexts, until a majority of the servers have submitted identical lists. Finally, it decrypts these ciphertexts, invokes the function f on the resulting plaintexts, and outputs the result. An ideal functionality of the mixing phase of the mix-net described above which takes El Gamal ciphertexts as input could be modeled by simply letting f be the function that lexicographically sorts its inputs. The first key generation step then corresponds to generating a joint El Gamal public key h with verifiably shared secret key z. This can be done by letting each party generate an El Gamal key pair ((g, h j ), z j ) and run Feldman's verifiable secret sharing protocol [12] using the secret key z j as secret and the public key h j as the first checking element. Then the joint public key h is the product h j of all the individual public keys (keys with incorrect sharings are ignored). 2 Ideal Augmentation. We use the following ideal key augmentation functionality. for an augmentation CS of CS B running with servers M1, . . . , M k , and ideal adversary S proceeds as follows.
1. Initialize D = ∅ and DM = ∅ and repeatedly wait for inputs:
B }| ≥ (k + 1)/2 for some pk B , go to Step 2.
Compute (pk
, set pk = (pk A : pk B ) and output (PublicKey, pk ). 3. Set DM ← ∅, and and repeatedly wait for inputs:
The functionality waits until a majority of the servers input the same public key pk B from the cryptosystem CS B . It then computes an augmentation (pk A , sk A ) = Aug(pk B ) of pk B (and the unknown sk B ), and outputs the resulting public key pk = (pk A : pk B ). If later a majority of the mix-servers request sk A it outputs it.
Note that this corresponds to extending the generation of the joint El Gamal public key to the generation of a joint Cramer-Shoup key. The joint "independent" generator g 1 can be generated exactly as the key h. The joint verification element c can be generated by letting each server M j generate its own (x j,0 , x j,1 ) and c j and invoking Pedersen verifiable secret sharing [20] where the secret shared is x j,0 , the constant component of the usually completely random polynomial is fixed to x j,1 , and c j is the first checking element. Then the joint element c is defined as the product c j of all the c j (keys with incorrect sharings are ignored). The joint element d is generated correspondingly. 3 The recovery phase corresponds to the recovery phase of Pedersen verifiable secret sharing.
Ideal Bulletin Board. We also need an authenticated ordered bulletin board. Realizing Secure Function Evaluation. We now give a secure realization of the secure function evaluation functionality in a hybrid model with the above ideal functionalities. -On an input (Input, ci) from Si write (i, ci) to FBB and ignore further messages from Si.
-On input (RequestOutput), write (RequestOutput) to FBB . If at least (k + 1)/2 servers have written (RequestOutput) to FBB , then go to Step 5. 5. Denote by T the contents written to FBB before the ⌈(k + 1)/2⌉th occurrence of (RequestOutput). Interpret T as a set of the form {(j, s)}, where j is the identity of the publisher of the information s. Define TC to consist of the set of (i, ci) such that |{j : (j, (i, ci)) ∈ T }| ≥ (k + 1)/2, i.e., at least (k + 1)/2 servers received (i, ci) from Si. We could extend our proof of concept such that it allows repeated secure function evaluation, but reusing the same instance of F CS B f . To do this we would also have to modify F f and F CS B f such that they keep track of several sessions. We could also extend the protocol such that different sets of submittors uses different augmentations of the basic public key pk B . This allows moving some of the work involved in stripping ciphertexts to the submission phase of the protocol. We hope the reader agrees that providing details for these extensions would give a much more complicated protocol, but little additional insight.
Future Work
In the mix-net application, all messages are free-form. This may not be the case in other applications. It is for example not the case in multi-candidate homomorphic election schemes, e.g., [8] , where the submitted messages must be of a special form to encode a valid candidate. It is an interesting question if it is possible to come up with an efficient hash proof system that constrains the set of messages in this way. This would give a very efficient non-interactive submission phase for such election schemes in the standard model.
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Denote by (i j , (π j , e j , π j )) the jth query of A to the decryption oracle Dec sk (·) (·), and let j l be the index of the last query before the adversary outputs its choice of challenge index and messages. Denote by (x, e, π) the challenge ciphertext, and let E be the event that A asks a decryption query (i j , (π j , e j , π j )) with H b k i j (x j , e j ) = π j ,
x j ∈ X \ L, and j ≤ j l or x j = x, for some index j before it requests sk
Proof. Consider an arbitrary fixed instance Λ of the subset membership problem and an arbitrary fixed random string of the experiment conditioned on the eventĒ. Define a function f : X × S × Π → {0, 1} as follows. Let f (x, α(k), π) simulate T outputs ⊥ if the event E occurs and α(k) determines H k on L by the projective property of H, so the answers of all queries are determined by α(k). When k ∈ K, x ∈ X, and π ∈ Π are randomly chosen, f (x, α(k), H k (x)) is identically distributed to T 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose we are given an adversary A in the hybrid model such that for every ideal adversary S, there exists an environment Z such that the difference between the output of Z in the two models is not negligible. We show that such an adversary contradicts the submission security of the cryptosystem CS derived from the cryptosystem CS B . We first describe an ideal adversary and then we reach a contradiction.
The ideal adversary. We first describe an ideal adversary S that simulates the hybrid protocol using A as a black-box, but with a number of modifications. Denote by J and I the indices of servers M j and submittors S i respectively corrupted by the adversary A in S's simulation. S corrupts the corresponding dummy parties in the ideal model. Then it proceeds with its simulation except for the following changes:
Short-circuit communication. We ensure that the environment essentially communicate directly to the simulated corrupted parties and the adversary as follows:
-Any input to a corrupted dummy submittorS i with i ∈ I is forwarded to the corresponding corrupted simulated submittor S i , and any output from the corrupted simulated submittor S i is forwarded to the corresponding dummy submittorS i . -Any input to a dummy serverM j with j ∈ J is forwarded to the corresponding simulated submittor M j , and any output from the corrupted simulated server M j is forwarded to the corresponding dummy serverM j . -Any input to S from the environment Z is forwarded to A and any output from A is forwarded to the environment Z.
Extraction from corrupted submittors. The ideal adversary must extract the inputs used by corrupted submittors in the simulation and hand these inputs to the ideal functionality F f . This is done as follows. When a pair (i, c i ) is written to F BB which implies that (i, c i ) will belong to the set T C the simulation of F BB is interrupted. Then S computes x i = Dec sk (c i ) and instructs the dummy submittorS i to hand x i to F f . When F f hands (Input, x i ) to S the simulation of F BB is resumed.
Simulation of honest submittors. When a dummy submittor hands an input to the ideal functionality F f , the ideal adversary must make sure that it appears as if the corresponding simulated submittor submitted the same input in the simulated hybrid protocol. This is done as follows. When S is handed (Input, i) with i ∈ I from F f it sets x ′ i = 0 and inputs (Input, x ′ i ) to the simulated submittor S i . Note that x ′ i most likely is different from the true value x i submitted by S i to F f .
Extraction from corrupted servers. When a corrupted server requests the computation of the function in the simulated hybrid protocol the simulator must make sure that the corresponding dummy server requests that the ideal functionality F f computes the function f as well. This is done as follows. When M j with j ∈ J writes (RequestOutput) to F BB the simulation of F BB is interrupted. Then S instructsM j to hand (RequestOutput) to F f . When F f hands (RequestOutput, j) to S, the simulation of F BB is continued.
Simulation of honest servers. When an honest server requests the computation of f from the ideal functionality F f , the corresponding simulated server must request the computation of f in the real protocol. This is done as follows. When S is handed (RequestOutput, j) with j ∈ J, it inputs (RequestOutput) to M j in its simulation.
Reaching a contradiction. Denote by Z the environment that is able distinguish the hybrid model from the real model that does not have negligible advantage. Denote by W 0 its output when executing the ideal model with S, and denote by W 1 its output when executing in the hybrid model with A.
Denote by H 0 the algorithm that simulates an execution in the ideal model with S and Z. Define H l to be H 0 except that when simulating the submission from an honest submittor S i with i ≤ l, it replaces the input x ′ i = 0, by the true value x i that was submitted byS i to F f . The true value can be extracted from F f , since H l simulates F f and can look at its internal data.
The result of this is that the output of H N is identically distributed to W 1 . This can be seen by inspection. More precisely:
1. An input extracted from a corrupt submittor is given to F f only if the corresponding output is guaranteed to be used in the computation of the output in the protocol. 2. An input is given to a simulated honest submittor only if the corresponding honest dummy submittor hands an input to F f in the ideal model. Since the correct inputs are used in H N the submitted cleartexts are also identical in the two models. 3. The output is requested from F f by a corrupted dummy server in the ideal model only if it is requested by the corresponding server in the protocol. 4. The output is requested in the protocol by an honest simulated server only if the corresponding dummy server requests the output from F f . 5. An output is generated in both models exactly when some ⌈(k + 1)/2⌉th server have requested the output, and the output is defined in both models as all messages/plaintexts submitted until the ⌈(k + 1)/2⌉th server requests the output. to use the reply sk A 1 as if it had generated it by itself. The final change to H i−1 is that when it is about to compute the simulated ciphertext c i it instead hands (0, x i ) to Experiment 1, and uses c i as before in the continued simulation.
The output of B is identically distributed to the output of H i−1 or H i respectively depending on if c i is an encryption of 0 or x i . Thus, B breaks the submission security of CS, which is a contradiction.
